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Abstract 
The aim of the paper is to re-assess the bank credit development in 11 Central and Eastern European 
countries and to provide new estimates of the credit-to-GDP ratio equilibrium level. Using filtering 
methods and dynamic panel estimations, our results suggest an “excessive” credit development for 
most of the studied economies until 2007. After this period, while credit has continued to remain 
excessive in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, it has decelerated in the other countries. 
However, while the results suggest a possibility of “credit crunch” in the Baltic republics and, to a less 
extent, in Croatia, credit deceleration may lead to “soft landing” for the Czech Republic, Romania and 
Slovenia. 
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1. Introduction 
There exists a general agreement among economists that strong credit growth has been 
“one of the most pervasive developments” (Enoch and Ötker-Robe, 2007) in most of Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEECs hereafter) in the recent years. The strong speed of the 
process has raised fears about financial and economic stability in a number of countries, in 
particular in Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, and Romania.2 Credit’s future development 
remains however relatively uncertain. On the one hand, the ongoing financial crisis that has 
visibly deteriorated the liquidity and external financing of the CEECs banking sector will 
most probably lead to credit deceleration and even to “credit crunch”. On the other hand, 
dynamics of credit can increase again with the world recovery and especially with the 
progress of the CEECs’ economic and monetary integration with the euro area.  
The main objective of this work is to shed some light on the private credit 
development in a group of 11 CEEC countries, analyzing whether the credit increase3 could 
be considered as “excessive” and its recent deceleration could be considered as a “soft 
landing” or rather with “credit crunch”.   
The assessment of excessive credit is rather difficult to perform, especially in the case 
of transition economies where excessive credit with respect to long-term equilibrium (or 
financial sector development) can be considered as part of the “catching –up” process. To 
analyze excess credit we follow two approaches. The first consists of estimating excessive 
credit compared to trend financial deepening (filtering method). The second method consists 
of estimating credit deviations from its long-term equilibrium, where to avoid the bias of the 
                                                        
2 Traditionally, a rapid credit growth increases banking sector exposure deteriorating the quality of balance 
sheets that can lead to banking crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997; Bernanke et al., 1999). This 
channel is especially relevant in the case of emerging countries presenting important financial challenges such as 
dependence on external financing and currency and maturity mismatches that make them vulnerable to sudden 
stops in capital inflows (Chang and Velasco, 1998, 2000). Other important credit-crises channel works thought 
rapidly developing financial intermediaries (Goldstein, 2001), poor regulated and/or malfunctioning banking and 
financial sector, and implicit or explicit public guarantees. 
3 It is worth to specify that “credit growth” refers here to an increase in private sector credit ratio (level) and that 
credit boom and “excessive” credit growth are used interchangeably.   
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CEECs’ adjustment process we estimate the out-of-sample equilibrium level for a panel 
developed European countries (which can be considered their “natural” benchmark).4  
The results based on these methods confirm a significant acceleration in private credit for all 
countries taken in exam until 2007. In particular, our findings suggest that the credit growth 
significantly exceeded the level which is consistent with financial development and 
macroeconomic fundamentals. After this period, while credit has continued to remain 
excessive in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, it has decelerated in the other countries. 
However, while the results suggest a possibility of “credit crunch” in the Baltic republics and, 
to a less extent, in Croatia, credit deceleration may lead to “soft landing” for the Czech 
Republic, Romania and Slovenia.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the stylized 
facts about the CEECs’ financial and banking sectors over the period of 1995-2008. Section 3 
presents the empirical methodology. Section 4 reports the results. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Financial Structure, Banking Sector and Credit Growth in the CEECs' economies: 
Stylized Facts (1995-2008) 
The CEECs have started their transition process at the beginning of the 1990’s. Since 
then, the structure of their economies and financial sectors has converged toward Western 
European standards. However, despite a considerable progress, the convergence process is far 
from being completed. For example, the CEECs' banking sector and financial markets when 
compared with the euro zone remain relatively underdeveloped. For example, at the end of 
                                                        
4 The use of one of these two methods is a common way to treat the problem of “excessive” credit growth in 
transition economies. The first paper analyzes the subject was proposed by Cotterelli et al. (2005). Further 
developments can be found  in Schadler et al. (2005), Backé et al. (2006) or Kiss et al. (2006).  Some papers 
focus only on a group of the CEECs – Brzoza –Brzezina (2005). Some of these works are regrouped in the book 
edited by Ch. Enoch and I. Ötker-Robe (IMF, 2007). For more detailed analyze see for example Coudert and 
Pouvelle (2008). 
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2008 financial intermediation (total banking assets in percent of GDP) reached over 100% in 
five CECs economies (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), almost 
80 % in the three Southern Eastern economies (Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania), which is still 
far from the euro-zone level: 262.3%.5 
The CEECs’ financial sectors are dominated by private banks, and credit constitutes 
the most important source of external financing for firms. At the end of 2008, total credit to 
non-banks reached on average 64.1% of GDP (127.8% in euro zone), of which almost 28.0% 
to household (53.1% in euro zone). Another feature of the CEECs’ banking sector is the 
predominant presence of foreign, mostly European, banking groups (Table 1) which market 
share in total banking assets accounts for almost 100 percent in some countries. 
Looking closely at the credit development, it is possible to notice important 
similarities among the CEECs such as i) a large part of foreign-denominated loans in total 
credits (Table 1) ; ii) an important role of external sources; iii) and an increasing role of 
domestic deposits for credit financing (Figure 1). At the same time, significant differences 
arise. For example, credit growth to the private sector has been rising at different rates (Figure 
1), starting at the end of the 1990’s in some countries, such as the Baltic Republics or only 
recently in the others (Figure 3). Indeed, credit growth has visibly increased in the Southern 
European countries (Croatia, Bulgaria and especially in Romania), but also in Slovenia. Credit 
expansion in the remaining economies but still some visible acceleration could be noticed 
since the period of 2006-2007. 
When private sector credit is analyzed, some heterogeneity can also be noticed. For 
example, credits to households, alimented in a great part by mortgage loans, exceeded these to 
private firms in Croatia, Estonia, Latvia and Poland. The opposite can be remarked for 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. In these countries 
                                                        
5 Raiffeisen Banking Sector Report (2009) 
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the part of credit to private firms6 is more important (Table 1). Moreover, in some countries 
the part of foreign-currency credits is more important than in the others. This is particularly 
visible in the Baltic countries where foreign-currency loans reached over 85% of GDP (55.6% 
in Lithuania), but also in the Southern Eastern European countries and Hungary (63.8%). In 
Slovakia and Slovenia the part of credit denominated in foreign currency, which in 2006 
exceeded 55% in 2006, has visibly deceased since their euro adoption (respectively 21.8 and 
9.6%). This heterogeneity in credit dynamics and distribution can have various causes, such 
as a different degree of economic development, development of financial intermediation, 
presence of foreign-owned banks and different institutional and regulatory frameworks.7 
 
3. Methodology 
To determine whether credit level can be considered as “excessive”, it is possible to 
adopt two different approaches. The first consists of estimating a country-speciﬁc trend and 
compare it with the actual credit development (Cottarelli et al., 2005). The second consists of 
estimating a country’s long-run equilibrium determined by fundamentals, and to compare it 
with the actual development. In both cases, the deviations between the actual and long-term 
values are used to detect situations of excessive credit growth.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
6 This « sectoral breakdown » can have important implications for the sustainability of credit boom. 
Traditionally, the credit expansion to private firms is considered as driving economic growth investment (see 
Kiss et al. (2006) for sectoral analysis). However, development of credit to firms can also be substitution effects 
of FDI inflows generating more volatile growth and greater probability of  economic downturn (see Calvo and 
Corricelli (1992, 1993) or more recently Corricelli and Masten (2004) for the role of credit in growth dynamics). 
Unfortunately data availability does not allow for more detailed bank credit data disaggregation. 
7 See Arcalean et al., (2005) in Ch. Enoch and I. Ötker-Robe (2007) for more detailed analysis of the causes and 
nature of private sector credit growth in the CEECs.  
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3.1. Credit deviation from its trend 
In the first approach we construct a country-speciﬁc backward-looking stochastic trend 
using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter as proposed by Gourinchas et al. (2001).8 Then the 
predicted credit ratio is compared to the actual one taking into account the size of each 
country's banking sector (relative deviation) and financial development (absolute deviation). 
The absolute deviation is the difference between actual private credit-to-GDP ratio and its 
long-term trend that corresponds to financial development of the country while the relative 
deviation is measured by the rapport of financial development on actual credit-to- GDP ratio 
that captures the size of banking sector. To determine if the resulting deviations indicate credit 
boom, i.e. the situation when the level of credit-to-GDP ratio remains above its long-term 
trend, we employ the threshold values as established in Gourinchas et al. (2001). 9 Following 
the authors, credit can be considered excessive compared to a country’s banking sector 
development if exceed q threshold level of 4.8 percent, and as “boom” if superior to 6.4 
percent. When compared to financial sector development, credit becomes excessive if exceeds 
the threshold of 24.9 percent, and as boom if superior to 31.1 percent. 
It is important to stress that, though useful and simple to use, the aforementioned 
method presents some important drawbacks: i) since the threshold values are established on 
the basis of previous leading-to-crises experiences, their choice remains arbitrary; ii) in the 
case of transition economies, the short data span and especially the initial low level of 
banking credit may bias the estimation of the trend.  
 
                                                        
8 The HP filter is applied on the credit-to-GDP ratio recursively from the beginning of the sample to successively 
the last five year include, i.e. 1995-2002, 1995-2003, …, 1995-2008. The smoothness parameter is set at 100, but 
the results are qualitatively unchanged if a smoothness parameter of 6.25. As suggested by Ravn and Uhlig 
(2002), the Hodrick-Prescott filter with this smoothness parameter produces cyclical components comparable to 
those obtained by the Band-Pass filter. Additional results are available from the authors upon request. 
9 Gourinchas et al. (2001) analyze a large sample of credit boom episodes over 40 years and define a leading 
boom as a deviation of the private credit-to-GDP ratio from its stochastic trend.  The authors consider two 
possible deviations: relative and absolute, and take into account two limit and boom threshold values for credit 
development.  These thresholds were defined to capture exactly 100 cases of lending booms in the sample of 91 
countries over the period of 1960-1996. 
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3.2. Credit deviation from long-term equilibrium 
The second approach consists of estimating the out-of-sample long-term relationship 
between the credit-to-GDP ratio and its fundamentals. The variables we consider are: i) GDP 
per capita ቀீ஽௉
௉௢௣
ቁ as proxy of economic development10; ii) financial liberalization, proxied by 
the spread between lending and deposit interest rate (S)11; real interest rate as measure of 
borrowing costs (r); inflation (p), and banking credit to public sector ቀ஻஼௉௉
ீ஽௉
ቁ to capture 
substitution effects between private and public credit. In detail we estimate the following 
equation:            ஻஼௉ௌ
ீ஽௉ ௜௧
= ݂ ൬ீ஽௉
௉௢௣ ௜௧
, ݎ௜௧  ,ߨ௜௧, ௜ܵ௧, ஻஼௉௉ீ஽௉ ௜௧൰                                                                  (1), 
where  ஻஼௉ௌ
ீ஽௉ ௜௧
 stands for each country private-credit-to-GDP ratio. 
The variables are pre-tested for the presence of unit roots, applying traditional panel unit 
tests.12 The tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, while reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root in first differences. However, we do not run the cointegration tests 
since the error correction terms from the pooled mean group (PMG) estimations can be used 
for this purpose. Indeed, if the variables are cointergrated, i.e. long-term equilibrium between 
them exist, the coefficient associated to the error term should have a negative statistically 
significant sign.13 The long-term equilibrium is then estimated using three different 
specifications. 
 The first specification consists in the traditional static panel model using a fixed-effects 
estimator. However, given possible endogeneity problems in the second specification we 
estimate a dynamic panel model by the GMM-Arellano and Bond estimator (1991). 
                                                        
10 This argument is supported by partisans of “supply-leading phenomenon” (McKinnon, 1973) and used in 
some growth models incorporating financial sector (Lucas 1988; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and 
Howitt, 1992). For more details see for example Levine, 1997. 
11 See, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Aghion et al. (1999). 
12 Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Breitung (2000), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), Fisher-type tests. The results are 
available from the author upon request.  
13 See Table 7-9. 
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The two aforementioned models can already provide useful information about credit 
developments, but their major limitation is that they estimate the average values of the 
parameters assuming homogeneity across the sample.14 So, we also model credit dynamics 
applying the following pooled mean group (PMG) estimator as developed by Pesaran, Shin 
and Smith (1999):15 
∆ ௜ܻ௧ = ߙ௜ + ߠ௜൫ݕ௜,௧ିଵ − ߚᇱݔ௜,௧ିଵ൯ + ∑ ߛ௜௝∆ݕ௜,௧ି௝௣ିଵ௝ୀଵ + ∑ ߛᇱ௜௝∆ݔ௜,௧ି௝ + ߝ௜,௧  ௤ିଵ௝ୀଵ                       (2), 
where, the ∆ ௜ܻ௧ stands for the actual credit-to-GDP ratio, ߚ are the common long-run 
parameters, ݔ௜,௧ି௝- is the vector of explanatory variables for group i. The country-speciﬁc 
short-term dynamics are measured by the ߠ௜ parameters (error correction terms) while 
unexplained country-speciﬁc effects are captured by  ߙ௜. This heterogeneous dynamic model 
has incontestable advantages in explaining credit growth development in the new EU 
countries, since different countries' features may imply different dynamics (speed) toward a 
common long-term equilibrium (Kiss et al., 2006).  
Equation (1) and (2) are estimated for a sample of Western European countries16, 
which constitute a ''natural'' benchmark for the CEECs’ economies.17 The estimated long-term 
coefficients are then applied to compute the equilibrium level of credit for each CEEC and to 
calculate the deviation between actual and predicted credit values.  
 
 
 
                                                        
14 Moreover the GMM –Arellano-Bond estimator has been designed for panels with a large number of groups 
(N) relative to number of time series (T) which is not the case in our study. 
15 This estimator allows the intercepts, short-run coefficients and errors variances to differ, but the long –run 
coefficients are constrained to be the same across groups. Indeed, there are good reasons to expect the long –run 
equilibrium relationships between variables to be similar across groups due, for example, to arbitrage conditions 
or common technologies influencing all groups in a similar way. 
16 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. 
17 We also run the in-sample estimations, but when the initial specification is applied, not all variables seem to be 
cointegrated, and some long-term coefficients are statistically insignificant and/or have unexpected signs, which 
confirms the existence of the “transition bias”. The results are available from the authors upon request. 
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4. Results 
4.1. Credit Deviation from Trend 
Table 2 reports the credit-to-GDP ratio and its absolute deviation from the trend. 
Looking at the table we can see that in 2008, five of the studied countries (i.e. Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) have credit levels well above the boom 
threshold and two of them (Hungary and Romania) above the excess threshold. 
These findings constitute a significant change when compared with previous credit 
developments. Indeed looking at the recent past, in 2002, only one country, Latvia, had an 
increase in the credit-to-GDP ratio that could be classified as excessive. In 2004, the credit 
level in Bulgaria was over the boom threshold and three countries (Estonia, the Czech 
Republic and Lithuania) were in a situation of excessive credit. In 2006, three more countries 
(Croatia, Romania and Slovakia) experienced excessive credit levels. In 2007, seven countries 
had credit levels well above the upper threshold (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia) and one country (Slovenia) had an excessive credit 
close to boom. 
However, when credit developments are compared to the size of banking sector 
(relative deviation) credits seem to be below the excess limit for several countries in most of 
the sample period (Table 3). For example, in 2008 all countries had a relative deviation well 
below the lower thresholds. In particular, the only countries that experienced a situation of 
excessive or boom credit over the 2002-2007 period were: Bulgaria (2003, 2004, 2005 and 
2007); the Czech Republic (2005, 2006, 2007); Lithuania (2005); and Romania (2007).  
However, a closer examination of the results (Table 2 and 3) reveals that the credit 
increase is particularly important in almost all of the countries under consideration until 2007. 
In some of them (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) credit 
increase has continued even in 2008. 
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4.2. Credit Deviation from long-term equilibrium 
Long term credit equilibrium levels are estimated for Western European countries over 
the period 1980-2008. In doing so we employed three estimation techniques (FE OLS, GMM 
and PMG) which suggested that the most robust determinants of credit are GDP per capita 
and inflation18 (Table 4). Out-of-sample credit equilibrium levels and the credit deviations are 
then computed using the estimated coefficient in Table 4. In particular, given the advantage, 
in terms of econometric properties, of the PMG over the other two econometric techniques, 
the PMG estimates were used.  
Looking at the out-of-sample estimations of credit growth and its deviations from 
actual values (Figure 2), the results suggest that for several countries credit was excessive in 
the recent years.  In detail, the countries that suffered from the credit contraction in the 1990's 
seem to improve their credit dynamics. The credit equilibrium has been achieved and even 
exceeded recently for Bulgaria, Hungary and Lithuania. In the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
the credit-to-GDP ratio showed a positive turning point in 2004. However, this tendency was 
much slower for Poland and Romania, where credit dynamics have been relatively stable, but 
some recent increase, especially in the case of Poland can be remarked.19 
For the last group of countries, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia and recently Slovenia, our 
findings confirm the persisting “overshooting” in credit development. Indeed, these countries’ 
credit-to-GDP ratio has stayed well beyond their long-term equilibrium for at least the three 
or four last years. In the case of Estonia, a visible deceleration in credit growth can already be 
                                                        
18 The full set of results and specification is available from the author upon request. GDP per capita and interest 
rate are included in all studies treating private credit growth. For example, Schadler et al. (2005) use PPP-based 
GDP and real long-term interest rate; Boissay et al. (2005) real GDP, real interbank rate and real retail lending 
rate and time trend; Backé et al. (2006) among other variables PPP-based GDP, short and long interest rate, 
inflation ; Kiss et al. (2006) use GDP per capita, interest rate and inflation.  
19 It is worth to underline that in the case of these two countries credit growth did accelerate in the recent period, 
but this tendency has also concerned the GDP per capita evolution, a variable used to determine the credit long-
term equilibrium in our study. 
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noticed since 2007. At the same time, a deceleration in credit growth can also be remarked in 
the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Romania. 
 
4.3. “2008” - End of excessive Credit? Soft Landing? Credit Crunch? 
Considering both estimation methods (Table 6), we can depict visible excessive credit 
for all of the CEECs. Indeed, all countries experienced excessive peaks in credit expansion 
during the period under exam. However, comparing the results from the different methods, 
some differences emerge. For example, filtering methods depict credit boom for the Czech 
Republic, Romania, Slovakia, and recently for Poland while the out-of-sample estimations 
find that credit level in these countries has stayed below its long-term equilibrium. Other 
important differences when these two approaches are compared concern the timing and 
duration of excessive credit. For example, filtering methods detect excessive credit growth 
earlier than panel estimations in the case of Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania and latter in case 
of Croatia, Estonia and Hungary.20 However, both methods confirm excessive credit in 
Slovenia since 2005, a visible acceleration in credit development in Poland and deceleration 
in Lithuania and Romania since 2007.  
When comparing with some previous analyses, we find the confirmation of 
“excessive” credit increase in the case of Estonia and Latvia, but also, to a less extent, in the 
case of Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia. For other countries, such as the 
Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, Romania and especially, until recently, for Poland the 
risk of credit boom has been low. The difference in the results can arise from different 
definition of credit boom, different methods used (filtering and long-term equilibrium 
methods), and different time periods covered. Indeed, the authors find that in some countries, 
                                                        
20These differences can arise from an uncertain causality relation between financial sector deepening and 
economic development. For more detailed analysis of causality see, for example, Diev and Pouvelle, 2008. 
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credit has reached its equilibrium level at the end of their estimation period and prolonging 
the estimation period we find that private credit has crossed this level. 
In all, it is possible to notice “excessive” credit developments in all CEE countries 
over the studied period. More precisely, in Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovenia, and close to “excessive” credit growth in the Czech Republic, Poland 
and Slovakia. In the case of one country – Romania, we can remark a visible credit increase, 
but the risk of “credit boom” remained relatively low. 
Credit boom episodes must end eventually, but whether it will be absorbed (“soft 
landing”) or followed by bursts (“credit crunch”) depends on many factors such as: sources of 
credit financing, currency and maturity structure of private sector and banks’ balance sheets, 
general and regional economic outlook, political environment, quality of bank supervision, 
prudential controls and financial development in the rest of the world. The excessiveness in 
credit development can become problematic and increases in most of the case the 
vulnerability of the countries. For example, growing foreign financing of private credit may 
lead to expensive “credit crunch” in the occurrence of sudden reversals in capital inflows. 
Moreover, in situation where credit growth is mostly denominated in foreign currencies, a 
sharp depreciation may increase debt burden and lead to solvability problems, banking and 
debt crises. In addition, it is also possible that credit “excessiveness” will increase the fear 
about financial sustainability, entailing banks deposits withdraws and lead to “bank runs” and 
crises. Finally, the fact that countries have the same lender can lead to a shift in investors’ 
behavior and increase the risk of contagion in the region.  
Although the lack of data for the last period makes impossible to draw more definitive 
conclusions about the CEECs mid-2000s “credit booms” and their ending, some interesting 
remarks can already be drawn:  
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i) The countries with the greatest (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) or growing (Croatia and 
Romania) financial disequilibria (currency mismatch, foreign credit financing) have noted a 
slightly increase in credit-to-GDP ratio in 2008. However, credit level compared to its long-
term trend has visibly decreased in all these countries. When we compare credit to their long-
term equilibrium level, we can notice a visible decrease in credit levels in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania since 2007, while in Romania and Croatia the deceleration has been less important. 
In all, our results seem to suggest that in these countries the mid-2000s “credit boom” has 
decelerated rapidly because of the negative turn in capital movements. In the Baltic Republic, 
especially in Estonia and Latvia, credit and demand booms raised fears about economic 
overheating already in 2007 alimenting the doubts about these countries financial and 
economic stability. The word liquidity crunch amplified risks reducing sharply bank credit, 
stock and housing prices and finally domestic demand and economic growth. Croatia has also 
suffered from the uncertainty about banking and financial stability, and has been confronted 
to slower foreign capitals inflows and deposits withdrawals that reinforced private credit 
contraction. In Romania, the authorities tried to curb “credit boom” implementing restrictive 
measures, but since the 4th quarter of 2008, the tightened lending conditions (liquidity 
constrains, external financing scarcity) have slowed credit demand contributing to economic 
slowdown. Except the above-mentioned countries, “credit crunch” can occur in the near 
future in Hungary. In fact, this country has reported a continuous increase in credit-to-GDP 
ratio as compared to its long-term trend and equilibrium, but since 2006 growing financial 
disequilibria and recession (resulting from the necessity of twin deficits correction) have 
increased the risk of expensive credit burst.    
ii) Credit boom has continued despite the general slowing credit dynamics in Bulgaria, Poland 
and Slovakia. More precisely, the credit-to-GDP ratio has continued to increase especially to 
the long-term equilibrium. Our findings may suggest that these countries have preserved their 
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banking and financial stability thanks to their strong fundamentals, growth perspective and, 
for Bulgaria and Slovakia, exchange rate agreements. For example, in Poland where after 
initial and short-lasting deposits withdrawals, credit has continued to growth thanks to strong 
fundamentals, sustained growth and authorities’ actions. Bulgaria has also noted an 
exceptional growth dynamics and financial sector stability during the ongoing financial crises. 
This was undoubtedly due to the very large foreign exchange rate reserves. Finally, Slovakia 
has been well protected by the euro adoption and remained almost completely unaffected by 
the financial crisis showing an increase in the private credit during the whole period.  
iii) For the remaining countries, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, we can remark a visible 
deceleration in credit ratio as compared to its trend and equilibrium since 2007, but whether 
this deceleration finishes “softly” or “crushed” remains uncertain.  On the one hand, these 
countries seem to be well protected from financial turmoil by the low dependence on external 
financing and the liquid and stable banking sector, and in the case of Slovenia – by the euro. 
On the other side, their small and open economies have suffered already from the global 
economic slowdown and the general uncertainty that affected internal and credit demands.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this work was to re-assess the bank credit development in 11 Central and 
Eastern European countries. In particular we tried  to determine whether the mid-2000s credit 
expansion could be considered as “credit boom” and the recent slowdown in credit growth 
qualified as “soft-landing” or rather “credit crunch”. For this purpose we considered credit 
level as “excessive” when it exceeded the equilibrium value that could be justified by 
country’s financial development and economic fundamentals. The critical values were 
determined on the basis of a stochastic trend and panel estimations of the long-term 
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equilibrium. The first method was carried out using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, and the second 
one applying the fixed-effects, dynamic and pooled mean group estimators. 
Our estimation results reported the “excessive” or close to “excessive” credit 
development in the case of all studied economies at least until 2007. After, this period, our 
findings corroborated the thesis about “credit crunch” in at least five of analyzed CEECs. 
More precisely, a general peak in credit expansion that can be qualified as “excessive” and 
continue to nowadays can be noticed for Bulgaria since at least 2003. Poland and Slovakia 
have visibly improved their credit dynamics since respectively 2006 and 2008. For the Baltic 
Republics, especially Estonia and Latvia, “credit boom” started at least in 2004 and finished 
in 2007 by the sharp decrease of credit ratio, that, accompanied by an important turn in capital 
inflows and economic slowdown, can be qualified as “credit crunch”. In two Southern Eastern 
European countries, Croatia and Romania, our results reported an important credit increase 
during at least 2006, but we also noticed, especially for Croatia, a sharp deceleration in credit 
growth after 2007. In the case of three Central European countries, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovenia, our finding confirmed a visible acceleration in credit dynamics that 
can be qualified as “excessive” in the case of Hungary and Slovenia since 2006 and 2005.  
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Figure 1: Change in Credit-to-GDP ratio, Banks Domestic Deposits and Net Foreign Liabilities 
in the CEECs (2004-2007)  
 
Source: IMF, Author’s calculations
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Figure 2 : Credit Deviation in the CEECs (out-of-sample estimations) 
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Figure 2 (cont.) : Credit Deviation in the CEECs (out-of-sample estimations) 
 
C. The Central Eastern European Countries 
  
 
 
Source:  Author’s estimations 
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Table 1: Banking Sector Survey, end of 2008 
 
Number 
of 
Banks 
Foreign-
owned 
banks(% of 
total) 
Capital 
Adequacy in 
risk weighted 
assets 
ROA ROE 
Foreign 
currency 
credit in 
total credit 
(%) 
Credit to 
households 
(% of GDP) 
Mortgage 
Loans 
(% of 
GDP) 
Credits 
to  firms 
(% of 
GDP) 
Bulgaria 30 86.3 14.9 2.2 15.8 57.2 26.0 12.4 49.2 
Croatia 33 90 14.2 1.6 10.1 63.8 36.8 15.3 28.3 
Czech Rep 37 88.5 12.3 1.2 21.7 14.1 21.8 14.3 23.0 
Estonia 17 98.2 12.9** 2.0** 21.4** 85.7** 46.9 41.0 30.5*** 
Hungary 38 83.5 11.1 1.2 16.1 63.8 28.1 22.5 30.5 
Latvia 27 65.7 11.8 0.3 4.8 85.0 39.2 31.1 27.5*** 
Lithuania 17 92.1 10.9* 2.0* 27.2* 55.6* 25.6 18.6 22.5*** 
Poland 70 67 11.5 2.1 26.4 34.3 29.0 16.9 17.1 
Romania 42 88.1 12.3 1.7 18.1 57.8 19.7 4.1 18.8 
Slovakia 26 96.3 12.0 1.2 17.8 21.8 17.5 12.3 23.3 
Slovenia 19 28.7 11.2 0.7 7.7 9.6* 17.8 n.a. 72.0 
*end of 2007; ** September 2008; *** end of 2006 
Source: Raiffeisen Bank Report, IMF Country Reports, EBRD 
 
 
Table 2: BCPS Ratio Absolute Deviation* from Trend, 2002-2008 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Bulgaria 3.4 14.3 10.0 14.3 10.0 16.6 11.9 
Croatia 3.9 2.5 1.8 2.3 4.6 3.9 -1.0 
Czech Rep. -4.2 1.7 5.4 9.5 13.3 11.5 12.2 
Estonia 0.4 1.7 5.0 6.2 9.7 9.3 3.2 
Hungary 1.6 4.4 3.6 3.9 3.1 3.5 5.7 
Latvia 5.2 6.1 8.0 12.9 16.4 9.0 2.8 
Lithuania 1.5 5.1 5.8 10.5 10.0 10.5 4.7 
Poland -1.0 -1.1 -1.4 -1.1 1.5 4.3 8.8 
Romania -0.7 1.3 1.4 2.8 4.7 8.7 6.2 
Slovakia -0.7 1.3 1.4 2.8 4.7 6.3 8.4 
Slovenia -0.6 -0.8 2.8 5.7 6.9 9.7 6.9 
*Absolute Deviation = Actual BCPS-Estimated (HP filter) BCPS Ratio; “excessive threshold” at 4.8 percent in bold and 
italic, “boom threshold” at 6.4 percent in bold. 
Source: IMF, Author’s calculations 
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Table 3: BCPS Ratio Relative Deviation*, 2002-2008 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Bulgaria 23.0 52.0 43.3 33.0 22.6 33.9 15.9 
Croatia 7.9 4.8 3.2 3.7 6.7 3.7 -1.5 
Czech Rep. -14.5 5.9 17.2 26.3 28.1 38.5 22.9 
Estonia 0.9 3.3 8.3 8.8 11.4 10.8 3.2 
Hungary 4.7 10.5 7.8 7.7 5.5 6.2 7.9 
Latvia 16.1 15.1 15.7 18.9 18.7 10.6 2.8 
Lithuania 9.5 22.4 20.0 25.7 20.0 20.8 7.3 
Poland -3.7 -3.8 -5.0 -3.6 4.5 12.3 17.0 
Romania -6.5 9.5 9.1 14.5 18.1 30.7 15.1 
Slovakia -15.6 -27.1 -16.3 4.9 12.1 17.7 8.0 
Slovenia -1.5 -0.2 5.6 9.7 10.3 13.8 17.8 
*Relative Deviation= (Actual BCPS Ratio-Estimated (HP) BCPS Ratio)/Actual BCPS; “limit threshold” at 24.9 percent in 
bold and italic, “boom threshold” at 31.1 percent in bold.  
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Table 4:  Long-term relationships between the credit-to-GDP ratio and explanatory variables: 
Western European countries. 
Estimator/Variables GDP/Capita Interest Rate 
Fixed Effect 0.76*** -0.06* 
GMM 0.67*** -1.20*** 
PMG 0.60*** -1.95*** 
*/**/*** significant respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Source: Author’s estimations 
 
Table 5: Error Correction Terms (ࣂ࢚) from the PMG estimator: Western European countries. 
Belgium -0.28** 
Denmark -0.62*** 
Finland -0.08** 
France -0.45*** 
Germany -0.10*** 
Ireland -0.63*** 
Italy -0.39*** 
The Netherlands -0.39** 
Portugal -0.11** 
Spain -0.26** 
Sweden -0.81*** 
The United Kingdom -0.12** 
*/**/*** significant respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Source: Author’s estimation 
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Table 6: Private Credit Boom in the CEECs: comparison 
 
Trend  
Methods 
Long-term 
Equilibrium 
Method 
 
Backé  et al. (2006) Kiss et al. (2006) 
Bulgaria 2003 2006 e( 2004) n.a. 
Croatia 2006-2007 2002 1994-2004 n.a. 
      Czech Rep. 2004 X X Low risk of credit boom 
Estonia 2004-2007 2003 e(2003) High risk of credit boom 
  Hungary 2008 2006 e(2003) Medium risk of credit boom 
               Latvia 2002-2007 2004 e(2003) High risk of credit boom 
   Lithuania 2003-2007 2007 X Medium risk of credit boom 
              Poland 2008 X X Low risk of credit boom 
 Romania 2006 X X n.a. 
 Slovakia 2006 X X Low risk of credit boom 
Slovenia 2005 2005 e(2004) Medium risk of credit 
The table should be read as follows: 1) The second and third columns report the date indicated the beginning (and eventually 
the end) of “excessive” credit growth, i.e. the year when credit level exceeds the level determined by financial development 
and fundamentals as estimated by our trend and long-term equilibrium methods. 2) The forth column present the results from 
Backé et al. (2006). The authors apply fixed-effect and panel dynamic ordinary least square, and mean group estimator and 
find that only Croatia has reached equilibrium in credit development in 2004 or rather over all studied period (bold figures). 
Other countries, namely Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia might reach the equilibrium level as well. Poland 
has recently approached its long-term equilibrium, while The Czech and Slovak Republics, Lithuania and Romania remain 
far from the equilibrium level. 3) The fifth column reports the results from Kiss et al. (2006). The authors also use the pooled 
mean group estimator for out-of-sample estimations in new EU countries (CEECs-8; n.a. not treated) and find that risk of 
credit boom is high in Estonia and Latvia. Estonia reached credit the highest equilibrium level determined for Luxembourg 
(constant term) in 2005 and Latvia has approached it. For other countries this risk is moderate or low. The CEECs have 
archived the lowest equilibrium level for Greece (constant term).It is worth to remain that we use the median value of a range 
of constants (see footnote 22). 
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Annex 
 
Table A1: Exchange Rate Regimes in the CEECs 
Bulgaria Managed Floating since Feb 1991 
Currency Board peg to Euro (DM) since July 1997 
Croatia Fixed Peg since 1992 
Managed Floating since Oct 1993 
Czech Rep. Managed Floating since May 1997 
Estonia Currency Board peg to euro (DM) since Jan 1996 
ERM 2 since June 2004 
Hungary Fixed Exchange Rate to the Basket of Currencies since Dec 1991 
Crawling peg/band to basket (+/- 2.25% bands) since Mar 1995 
To Euro since Jan 2000, +/- 15% bands since May 2001 
Floating since the end of 2003 
Latvia Fixed Exchange Rate peg to SDR since 1994 (+/-1%) 
Peg to euro since Jan 2005, ERM 2 since May 2005 
Lithuania Currency Board peg to USD since Apr 1994 
Peg to Euro since Feb 2002, ERM 2 since Jun 2004 
Poland Fixed Exchange Rate peg to basket since May 1991 
Crawling peg/band to basket since Oct 1991 
Bands widened since Mar 1995 (+/-2.0%) to Mar 1999 (+/-15%) 
Free Floating since Apr 2000 
Romania Managed Floating since Aug 1992 
Slovakia Fixed Exchange Rate peg to basket since Jan 1991 
Bands widened since Jan 1996 (+/-3%) and since Jan 1997 (+/- 7%) 
Managed Floating since Oct 1998, ERM 2 since Nov 2005 
Euro adoption Jan 2009 
Slovenia Managed Floating since Oct 1991 
ERM 2 since Jun 2004, Euro adoption Jan 2007 
Source: IMF, National Central Bank 
 
 
 
Table A2: Variables description 
The Credit-to-GDP ratio It is rather common in the case of the CEECs' economies to model the equilibrium 
credit-to-GDP ratio instead of credit itself (Boissay et al., 2005) since the evolution 
of this ratio can be considered as the progress in their transition process. 
 
GDP per Capita A positive relation between two variables is expected since financial deepening 
increases with economic development and permanent income and vice-versa. 
 
Real Interest Rate  Interest Rate is adjusted by current inflation rate to capture the cost of borrowing. 
 
Inflation Threshold. High inflation, i.e. exceeding certain threshold value, is excepted to have negative 
effect on credit growth. The non-linear threshold is set as in Cottarelli et al. (2003) 
and Khan et al. (2001) at 4 percent and inflation dummy is computed as follows: inf = ݀ݑ݉ × ܥܲܫ. 
 
Financial Liberalization Effect Several authors establish a positive effect that financial liberalization has on 
financial deepening. This effect is approximated by a decreasing spread between 
lending and deposit rates. 
 
Crowding-in, Crowding-out effect A negative relation between an increase in bank credit to the public sector and 
ﬁnancial development is rather straightforward. 
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